Boutros-Ghali suggested that the Security Council consider
a French-command multinational operation under a chapter-seven mandate.
I passed the cable on to Dr. Kabia and to Henry,
asking them both to study our options under this Orwellian scenario.
Annan, Riza and Baril also thought the scenario beyond belief.
But I should make no mistake: it was going to happen.

FRANCE ORWELLIANLY AIDS RWANDA

French flags draped every street corner in the capital.
"Vive la France" was heard more often in Kigali than it was in Paris.
Hate Radio was continuing to tell the population that
the French were on the way to join them to fight the RPF.

The book I've read so far that paints the best overall picture of what the French were doing in Rwanda during the 1994 Genocide is SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL by General Romeo Dallaire, and so I'm once again using excerpts from that book. Dallaire says that if he accomplished nothing else (which he did) in Rwanda, then at least he was a witness, and he comes across all the way through as being a truthful witness, which is a huge part of what makes his story so fascinating to read, and also a good reference book for putting events into place and time.

I've divided the excerpts into three sections to be read consecutively. All words in [square brackets] have been added by me as interpretations of unfamiliar initials and terms. ~ Jackie Jura

"Shake Hands With the Devil"
by General Romeo Dallaire
excerpts from pages 422-448

...On the afternoon of June 17, the day after I got back from Nairobi, I was in my office attacking paperwork with a vengeance, when Phil appeared at my door. Behind him were Bernard Kouchner and another Frenchman, introduced by Kouchner as a representative of President Mitterand's crisis committee on Rwanda. I thought that they were not especially smart to be here, with the RPF [Tutsi Army] in Kigali and not fond of the French. Still I was in some ways pleased to see Kouchner, a man of great energy and presence, even if I never knew when or if his humanitarianism masked the purposes of the French government.

Unlike the first time we had met, when he had just barged in, Kouchner asked politely if I could spare him an hour or so, explaining that he was acting as an interlocutor for his government in the field and had been sent specifically to see me. At least this time his role was clear. Kouchner opened the conversation by recapping the horrendous situation and deploring the lack of action by the international community -- it was easy for me to agree with that. But then he floored me. The French government, he said, had decided that in the interests of humanity, it was prepared to lead a French and Franco-African coalition force into Rwanda to stop the genocide and deliver humanitarian aid. They would come in under a chapter-seven UN mandate and set up a safe haven in the west of the country where people fleeing the conflict could find refuge. He asked me for my support. Without a pause, I said, "Non!"--and I began to swear at the great humanitarian using every French-Canadian oath in my vocabulary. He tried to calm me with reasons that probably sounded high-minded to him but, considering the track record of the French in Rwanda, struck me as deeply hypocritical: surely the French knew that it was their allies who were the architects of the slaughter. Just then Phil Lancaster opened the door, cutting Kouchner off. Phil needed me outside right away. I excused myself and went to see what the crisis was....

Kouchner and his colleague, who were settled uneasily in two springless armchairs, were still waiting for me in my office. I told Kouchner I could not believe the effrontery of the French. As far as I was concerned they were using a humanitarian cloak to intervene in Rwanda, thus enabling the Hutu RGF [genocidal Hutu Army] to hold on to a sliver of the country and retain a slice of legitimacy in the face of certain defeat. If France and its allies had actually wanted to stop the genocide, prevent my UNMOs [UN unarmed Military Observers] from being killed and support the aims of the UN mission -- something France had voted in favour of twice at the Security Council--they could have reinforced UNAMIR [UN Assistant Mission for Rwanda ] instead.

But Kouchner and his compatriot clearly wanted me to stop arguing. They did not say that my mission should be subordinated to the French one but nonetheless left me with that impression. They said that I should concentrate on getting UNAMIR 2 [UN Assistance for Refugees] operational in the RPF [Tutsi Army] zones over the next four months, while they sorted out the RGF-held [Hutu Army] territories and their supposed safe area. I concluded that they had come to see if I would voluntarily agree to subordinate UNAMIR to the French force. There was no chance of that.

I ended the meeting abrubtly when I heard the sound of the Hercules overhead. Kouchner wanted some support from us when he went to meet with the RPF [Tutsi Army]; I told him we would do our best to help despite my complete disapproval of the French course of action. I thought he was positively nuts to try to argue his position with a rebel army [RPF] who hated the French. What I did not know at this point was that the French government and military had already held high-level meetings with RPF [Tutsi Army] representatives in Europe about this plan, and that members of the RGF [Hutu Army], including Ephrem Rwabalinda, my RGF [Hutu Army] liaison officer, had been to Paris to discuss the coming French intervention. I had been kept in the dark like a mushroom -- and fed plenty of fresh manure.....

That night, French media reported France's plan to deploy troops to Rwanda, news that was soon picked up by RTLM [Hutu Army's Hate Radio] and the other local stations and broadcast to the nation. The defending forces [Hutu Army] in Kigali went mad with joy at the prospect of imminent rescue by the French. Their renewed hope and confidence had the side effect of reviving their hunt for genocide survivors, which put in further jeopardy those who remained in refuges in the few churches and public buildings that had been left untouched. The genocidaires believed the French were coming to save them and that they now had carte blanche to finish their gruesome work....

Among the overnight batch of cables was one from Riza [UN Security Council head Annan's deputy in New York]. In short, he told me to keep my head on....My mandate for the last month had been to do exactly what I had been doing. Now Riza was advising me to isolate the mission in Kigali and stop trying to maintain contact with the RPF [Tutsi Army] and the interim government [genocidal Hutu government]. He told me that until the reinforcements arrived, which could take two or three months, I should limit UNAMIR to passive guarding of our sites in and around Kigali.

In the same cable he officially informed me of France's desire to send troops into western Rwanda, and told me to sort out what my role would be in relation to the intervention. Riza confirmed that the French were mounting a separate operation that would not fall under my command, and said it would resemble the U.S.-led Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Riza advised me that the new mission [French Army] could be on the ground even before the Security Council authorized it. "You should ensure that only the cooperation absolutely necessary is provided by UNAMIR and that cordial relations are established," he wrote. In UN-ese this was a circumlocution designed to let me know that I should cover for the DPKO [UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations] and the secretary-general [Boutros-Ghali] by not being too cooperative with the French before their mandate was approved. The trouble was that this meant I should not be in touch with the French force until the need was urgent, and I was the one with the most current information on the ground, yet I was to observe the niceties and not try to enlighten the French.

Much as I resented the mission that the French would dub "Operation Turquoise" [French Army], I thought that not sharing the picture on the ground was a mistake. I later realzied that a number of officers who became part of Turquoise [French Army] had been French military advisers to the RGF [Hutu Army] until the start of the war. How would their presence strike the RPF [Tutsi Army], who had to suspect that the French were not on a purely humanitarian mission? And how much encouragement would the presence of their former advisers [French Army] bring the RGF [Hutu Army] and the extremists of the Presidential Guard [top genocidaire's guards], who were already ecstatic in the streets of Kigali? The appearance of UN-sanctioned French soldiers was going to make it even tougher for UNAMIR to deal with the RPF [Tutsi Army]. Riza wrote, "RPF perceptions of the operation itself will determine their attitude and we hope that this will not strain relations with UNAMIR." If I hadn't felt so grim, I would have laughed. Of course, all my remaining Franco-Africans would be at even greater risk.

I passed the cable on to Dr. Kabia and to Henry, asking them both to study our options under this Orwellian scenario, in which a UN force [French Army] under chapter seven and a UN force [Dallaire's Army] under chapter six would have to function in the face of a determined belligerent [Tutsi Army]. The French troops were reputed to be aggressive, and the RPF was pushing to conquer the whole country. Would we by default become a peacekeeping force between the French and the RPF?

The follow-up phone calls between me and the triumvirate were somewhat reassuring. Annan, Riza and Maurice also thought the scenario beyond belief, and they were not keen on the French initiative. But I should make no mistake: it was going to happen....

Before I met with Tiko and the UNMOs [unarmed Military Observers], I had gone to see [General] Kagame [leader of Tutsi Army]. Setting off with my usual escort, we took a route north from the city and then circled around to the east before heading south and finally turning west on obscure dirt roads toward the Nyabarongo River....

We were in newly conquered RPF [Tutsi Army] territory, which was deserted except for the corpses and rebel soldiers. The RPF guide who was taking us to Kagame moved along at a fair clip, seemingly oblivious to the impact on his vehicle of the cratered and scarred dirt trail. The RPF had mechanics and spare parts, but I had neither. My four-by-four had to see me through the war and I deliberately slowed the pace.

When we reached the river, across which Kagame had made yet another temporary headquarters in his advance, the opague earth-coloured water was high and fast. The RPF engineers had constructed a pontoon-type bridge that light pickup trucks could cross gingerly. Getting out of my vehicle, I noticed a number of soldiers with long poles upstream, pulling bloated bodies up on the bank. To me this was now such a commonplace sight it did not penetrate my protective screen.

I did not want to risk our vehicles on the bridge so we made our way across on foot. I noticed that clothes were caught between the struts of the floating base and I stopped to look over the side. Staring up at me were the faces of half-nude corpses, stuck under the bridge. There were alot of them. In some places they had accumulated to the point that we were actually walking on a bridge of dead bodies. On the far bank, soldiers were trying to pry them loose for fear that their weight would pull the bridge apart. The screen shattered, my stomach heaved and I struggled for composure. I couldn't bear the movement of the bridge, up and down on the slaughtered hundreds.

The first thing I raised with Kagame when I reached his small command bungalow was the ambush on my UNMO team -- it was out of my mouth even before the news of Turquoise....

We moved on to the French. I asked him about meeting with Kouchner; Kagame was inscrutable on the subject. I told him I was becoming concerned that I, and my mission, were being used as a kind of public relations front to distract the world from others' hidden agendas. He denied this wholeheartedly. I said I was definitely not looking for a fight. Though I expected the RPF to react to the French and to be confrontational, the triumvirate had told me over the secure phone that the United States was putting considerable pressure on the RPF to cooperate. I told Kagame that I would handle the French proposals to firm up their area of operationas and that I'd be a conduit between him and Turquoise [French Army]. I would insist that the French not deploy in Kigali; ultimately the capital should be under my control to prevent the French getting anywhere near his forces. For a moment Kagame just looked at me. Then in a very confident fashion, he told me that I shouldn't worry about that. The French would not be entering Kigali. As to the reason why, his assessment was blunt: "Tell France that Kigali can handle more body bags than Paris."

I dreaded the return trip over that bridge of death. As I picked my way back across, I was careful not to look over the sides or down through the slats, but I could not get out of my mind the fact that I was walking on bodies.

I had little to add to the sitrep that night except for my concerns about the bigger game going on to which I was not privy. That evening at prayers, I asked Henry to assess the risk of conflict in and around Kigali and to once again draw up plans for a possible withdrawal. The capital could soon become a major battle zone.

On June 19, the date that UNAMIR 2 should have had 4,600 soldiers in Rwanda, my troop strength stood at 503, and we were still living with all of the problems and shortages that had plagued and undermined us in April. The secretary-general [Boutros-Ghali] wrote to the president of the Security Council on that date to say that the phase-one deployment was about to go ahead, but that because no nation had provided a fully equipped and trained batallion, UNAMIR 2 would not be operational for at least three more months. In these circumstances -- combined with an exponential increase in humanitarian problems and the fact that UNAMIR was taking casualties as it attempted to provide a modicum of support for Rwanda -- Boutros-Ghali suggested that the Security Council consider a French-command multinational operation under a chapter-seven mandate to assure the security and protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda. He also asked that governments maintain their troops until UNAMIR 2 was up to strength.

Since [SRSG] Booh-Booh [Special Representative of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali] was officially gone [quit on June 14 when he realized Tutsi Army was winning], I had to formally assume his political duties. On June 20, I forwarded a document called "Assessment of the Proposed French-Led Initiative in the Rwandese Crisis."...

I raised grave concerns about what area the French were in fact going to occupy. Was it their intention to support the RGF [Hutu Army] right into the capital, or were they looking to avoid confrontation with the RPF [Tutsi Army]? Nobody could tell me. Boutros-Ghali's letter to the president of the Security Council simply stated that the French wished to help "displaced persons in Rwanda," which could mean anywhere. For the next six days, my discussions with New York, Paris, Kigali, the RPF [Tutsi Army] and the French force (I don't remember the RGF [Hutu Army] being a party to these negotiations) concentrated on drawing a single line in the western part of Rwanda to delineate the French zone.

On June 21, I sent them all a drawing of the tactical layout of the RPF [Tutsi Army] positions as of that day. After the French announcement, the RPF [Tutsi Army] had accelerated its campaign, and the RGF [Hutu Army] had also sped up its withdrawal toward the west, with an estimated two and a half million Rwandans moving ahead of them. Even while the French awaited final authorization from the UN, the RGF-held territory was shrinking, mostly in the south. I ended up negotiating the final line that the RPF [Tutsi Army] and the French would accept as the French zone of operations. I subsequently sent UNMOs to liaise with both sides to confirm the lines on the ground. And so, as I had predicted, above all the other tasks my small force still had to perform, we were turned into a chapter-six peacekeeping force between a UN chapter seven force and the winning side of the civil war.

When news of the French intervention was broadcast in Rwanda the RPF [Tutsi Army], as I had feared, retaliated against my Franco-African officers from Togo, Senegal, Mali and Congo. They were robbed, insulted and roughed up to the point where I had to confine them to camp. I negotiated their withdrawal from the mission area for their own safety and informed New York of my decision. On June 21 I said farewell to these magnificent Franco-African officers, who had served the mission well since the previous November. Being the only francophones in the mission, they had had to conduct most of the tasks in the RGF [Hutu Army] sector and had been exposed to more than their fair share of danger....

The departure of the Franco-Africans stripped me of most of my French-speaking staff officers. For the third time since the short history of this mission, I had to rebuild my headquarters from the bottom up, all the while continuing with operations....

The Canadians stepped into the breach to become the sole French speakers in my headquarters but their effectiveness was somewhat limited by the fact that all Canadians were under attack on [Hutu owned] hate radio, because of me and because of Canada's initiative to launch the full-scale human rights investigation into the Rwandan war. In my note to the DPKO about bringing in the new UNMOs, I warned that "FC [Force Commander] will be forced to move the Canadian contingent out also, if situation does not improve. At this time FC is about to restrict their movement to RPF [Tutsi Army] territory only."....In those days after the announcement of Operation Turquoise [French Army], I came very close to saying, "Pull us all out, we capitulate, we can't go on."....

On June 21 the RPF's [Tutsi Army] New York office issued a press release and a letter to the new president of the Security Council, Salim Bin Mohammed Al-Khussaiby. If the council approved the French mission, the RPF requested that it should "simultaneously authorize the withdrawal of the existing contingent of UNAMIR. The Rwandese Patriotic Front [Tutsi Army] is concerned that its personnel may not always be in a position to make a clear distinction between UNAMIR and other foreign forces in the event of an escalation of hostilities. We have, regrettably, come to the conclusion that it is necessary that UNAMIR personnel be withdrawn to safety, at least on a temporary basis." The powers-that-be ignored the RPF position and carried on. The next day, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 929, which provided France with a chapter-seven mandate to assemble a coalition and intervene in Rwanda. The OAU [Organization of African Unity] initially opposed the intervention, but under pressure from the Franco-African states, changed its mind....

That night I got a code cable from the DPKO giving me some very limited guidance. The French had promised to avoid the conflict lines between the RGF [Hutu Army] and the RPF [Tutsi Army]. The cable read, "We don't expect the French to propose a presence in Kigali, but if they do please inform us immediately and we shall try to persuade them, given RPF [Tutsi Army] sensitivities and other problems such a presence may cause." To me it looked like the French were still thinking about coming into Kigali, and I imagined what it would be like if French paratroopers landed here. I had to get our withdrawal plans finalized....

The last paragraph of the code cable informed me that Booh-Booh's replacement, a Pakistani career diplomat named Shaharyar Khan, was "stopping in various capitals for consultations" at the request of Boutros-Ghali while on his way to UNAMIR.

By now French flags draped every street corner in the capital. "Vive la France" was heard more often in Kigali than it was in Paris. RTLM [Hutu Army Hate Radio] was continuing to tell the population that the French were on the way to join them to fight the RPF [Tutsi Army]. It seemed to me that for every life that Operation Turquoise [French Army] would save, it would cost at least another because of the resurgence of the genocide.

On June 22, the attitude of the RPF [Tutsi Army] changed dramatically toward all of us. Hostility, rudeness, threats and direct attacks were the order of the day as the RPF accused us, as the representatives of the UN in Rwanda, of co-operating with the UN-mandated French intervention. Kagame's position was that we should immediately withdraw because he could not guarantee our safety. I took several tries to arrange a meeting with him at which I explained the stated purpose of the French operation as loyally and directly as I could. I thought I persuaded him we were not part of some diabolical conspiracy to deny the RPF its victory or protect or promote genocide....

Operating in a void of information, I had to guess how the French would enter Rwanda and how they would conduct their operations. I knew Burundi had denied French transit and that Uganda would do the same. Tanzania had no infrastructure in the west that the French could use. I had denied entrance through Kigali. I told New York that if the French were permitted to enter that way, I would resign my command; if French planes appeared at the airport, I'd shoot them down. I also shot my mouth off on the subject to the media. To a certain extent, I meant it: if French troops landed in the middle of Kigali, it would set off a gigantic battle with the RPF [Tutsi Army] and permit the RGF [Hutu Army] and the interim government [genocidal Hutu government] to continue to function. I was assured by the DPKO that Kigali was out of the question.

That left only Zaire (today the Republic of Congo). Goma, at the northern end of Lake Kivu, had a modern airport that needed repair but could support the French. There was also an airfield at Bukavu at the southern end of the lake. I decided that if they [French Army] went only through Goma and Gisenyi, just inside the Rwandan border, that would confirm that they were really coming in to support the RGF [Hutu Army]. If so, I could expect them to enter combat operations against the RPF {Tutsi Army], which by default would drive a direct reprisal against UNAMIR and force our withdrawal. However, if the French entered through Bukavu, aross the border from Cyangugu, to the west of where the vast majority of persons at risk were congregating, then their motives might be solely humanitarian and we could continue our mission.

Even before the Security Council had taken its final decision on June 22, the French were already landing in Goma, which I found out through media reports on the morning of June 23. So much for the argument that the international community did not have the means to rapidly deploy UNAMIR 2. On the same day, the RPF [Tutsi Army] announced that it was not opposed to a French operation if it was confined to humanitarian aims. And with our Franco-Africans gone, hostility toward UNAMIR immediately subsided, and we again began to push our patrols out from Kigali. Unfortunately almost all of the Hutu population, driven by RTLM [Hutu government Hate Radio], the RGF [Hutu Army] and the Interahamwe [Hutu genocide militia], were now moving to the west. Even more tragically, as the population moved it was again subjected to Interahamwe roadblocks, where not only surviviving Tutsis were killed but also those without identity cards. Even a suspected "cockroach" had to die.

On June 24 the French [Army] entered Rwanda in patrol strength and were reported in the media to be in Gisenyi in the north and Cyangugu in the south and pushing beyond those locations. I was sure that if the French got too close to the RPF [Tutsi Army], a firefight would ensue; I had to get to the French commander, General Jean-Claude Lafourcade, to confirm his intentions and exchange liaison officers with his force. I wasn't going to wait for him to come to me.

I contacted New York to ask the DPKO to determine, through the French Mission staff, where the Turquoise [French Army] headquarters was in the field and to secure a meeting for me with its commander. Again, the DPKO directed me to co-operate with the French, be patient and understand the realpolitik. I replied that I expected no good to come of Operation Turquoise. From my perspective it looked like a cynical exercise in furthering French self-interest at the expense of the ongoing genocide. I failed to get anything from my bosses but tepid promises to consider my views.

With the RPF [Tutsi Army] apparently calmed down about the French presence, I briefed Henry on the need to get the civilian transfers going again and to arrange for the moving of RGF [Hutu Army] prisoners of war from the Red Cross and King Faisal hospitals. I also told him that we had to regain contact with the interim government [genocidal Hutu government] to restart the ceasefire negotiations that had come crashing to a halt after the hostage-taking in our compound, and keep an eye on its relationship with the French. We also needed to liaise with the interim government [genocidal Hutu government] wherever it was in order to keep up our humanitarian efforts; the aid groups, with their increasing burden of displaced people, needed a conduit to the shrinking RGF [Hutu Army] zones....

The RPF [Tutsi Army] was mounting its assault on Kigali with renewed vigour. I hadn't seen too much of Ndindiliyimana lately, but Kouchner and the Gendarmerie were doing good work in moving and protecting some of the orphans caught in the RGF [Hutu Army] zones of Kigali. Other moderate RGF [Hutu Army] leaders had disappeared from the capital over the last week. They must have been worried about what might happen to them given the renewal of purpose that the French arrival was inspiring in the extremists....

On June 26, I sent Henry to meet with Bizimungu [Hutu Army Chief of Staff] at the Meridien hotel to lay the groundwork for resuming the ceasefire negotiations....

When we got back to Force HQ, Henry told me that Bizimungu had been in exceptionally good spirits and was serene and even friendly. (This was a major shift from the week before, when Bizimungu had behaved as though his cause was totally lost.)...Henry had also finally confirmed through Bizimungu that the interim government [genocidal Hutu government] was holed up in Gisenyi, with some ministers possibly even in Goma; Bizimungu had told him that my upcoming trip to Goma to see General Lafourcade was an excellent opportunity to meet the minister of defence there....

My days started to fill up with innumerable administrative demands, and we had even fewer HQ staff than we had had last November. We were in the centre of an ongoing genocide, and we could not let up at all....

Two troubling incidents had already occurred between the French and the RPF [Tutsi Army]. The RPF had ambushed a section of at least ten Turquoise [French Army] soldiers who had moved too far into the Butare prefecture. No one was actually hurt in that ambush, but French pride suffered a blow -- special forces had to negotiate the troops' release. The other incident happened on the road from Kibuye to Gikongoro. Shots were fired and two French soldiers were saved only by their flak jackets. Both patrols had been outwitted by the RPF [Tutsi Army] and shamed in the process. This did nothing to dissuade the French from wanting to support their former colleagues [the genocidal Hutu government] and put the RPF in their place....

On June 26 we held a mission medals parade in the courtyard near the Force HQ's main entrance, surrounded by a pile of shot-up, broken-down and cannibalized UN four-by-fours....

The next day, I met Henry at the airport for the Ghanaian battalion's medals parade. Before we got started, he passed on the disturbing follow-up to his session with Bizimungu. Headquarters staff had made inquiries at the Kigali prefecture about resuming the transfers of displaced persons and orphans. A meeting had been held with the sous-prefect, who very matter of factly stated that the interim government [genocidal Hutu government] did not see any value in carrying on with their transfers: the French forces would be in the capital soon and they would be able to provide proper protection for all. The sous-prefect also said he thought that when the French arrived and saw people in the camps, it would prove to them that the Kigali authorities had seen to their welfare. Clearly the interim government and its underlings believed the French were actually making their way toward Kigali. As Henry said to me in a very low voice, these were "a very sick-in-the-head group of people."...

That day I spent time with the operations team and Henry, as well as the two Rwandan liaison officers, to come up with the most accurate demarcation line between Turquoise [French Army] and the RPF [Tutsi Army]. We had sent a few UNMO [unarmed military observers] teams to scout the main routes and bring us news of the RPF [Tutsi Army] front line. It was evident that Kagame was finally moving with speed -- but not recklessly -- into the western part of the country along two principal axes, one running to Butare and the border with Burundi, and the other aiming directly at Ruhengeri, to link with his forces there (soldiers who had kept many RGF [Hutu Army] battalions tied up in the heart of the extremist country). The fighting was getting stiffer by the day in Kigali; as Kagame had indicated to me, he aimed to take the city before any possible intervention from the French. We were losing the battle to keep displaced people inside Rwanda in the north; they were fleeing in front of Kagame's advance. The potential Turquoise [French Army] area was becoming quite limited in that part of the country....

The morning of June 28 was filled with finalizing the last-minute details on Turquoise [French Army] and the front line of the RPF [Tutsi Army]. There was a lot of action in the city and, whenever I could find the time, I went to the roof to check out our surroundings through my binoculars. All I was able to spot were plumes of smoke and a few RPF [Tutsi Army] troops moving in the open.

I left Kigali around 1300, heading under escort for the Merama border and crossing into Uganda. I then flew by UNOMUR [UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda] helicopter to Entebbe and caught a Hercules flight to Nairobi, arriving after supper. My aide-de-camp and four members of the media came with me, and on the trip to Goma we would be joined by the four-person UNMO liaison team who were to be our eyes and ears on the French force.

Tensions and confusion were building regarding UNAMIR's authority to coordinate humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts throughout Rwanda....Humanitarian support was still at a minimum in the RGF [Hutu Army] zones, where most of the people in need were trying to survive amid constant moves west. June 29 in Nairobi was an arduous exercise in patience, posturing and repeating myself to deaf ears. I had already alienated the French defence minister, Francois Leotard, who was on an inspection visit to his troops and had asked to meet me the same day in Cyangugu. I hadn't been able to go because I was supposed to be in Nairobi, and he was quite put out. I, however, was just as glad. He was travelling with an entourage of media, and any sign that I had rushed to his side would have given RPF [Tutsi Army] cause to question my neutrality.

My meetings in Nairobi were with the diplomatic community, the UN civilian administration support staff, the media and the NGOs. As usual, the diplomats promised support without making specific commitments. The media was focused on Turquoise and wanted me to threaten the French again so they could grab a punch news clip (which I declined to do). The administration offered excuses instead of results, and the NGOs renewed their demands for independence and non-involvement with the military for reasons of neutrality, at the same time as they called for an "atmosphere of security" to allow them to do their work....

Before I left for Goma, I held a medals parade for the mission's eighty or so Franco-African and other UNMOs and military staff who had been evacuated to Nairobi...

Go next to 2 of 3: FRENCH HUMANITARIAN ARMY AID

RWANDA GENOCIDE HORROR and 60 MINUTES READING RWANDA

Jackie Jura
~ an independent researcher monitoring local, national and international events ~

email: orwelltoday@gmail.com
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